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Animal Humanism: Race, Species, and 
Affective Kinship in Nineteenth-Century 
Abolitionism
Brigitte Nicole Fielder
In the antebellum United States, attempts to exclude nonwhite people from the category of the human illustrated why humanist arguments, such as the iconic antislavery question “Am I Not a Man and a Brother?,” became 
necessary to combat racism and slavery.
Figure 1.
“Am I Not a Man and a Brother?,” title page, The Life and Adventures of Oaudah Equiano (New York: 
Samuel Wood & Sons, 1829). Courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society.
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As abolitionists were well aware and historians have shown, comparisons 
between people of African descent and nonhuman primates were often made 
in arguments meant to justify enslavement and imperialism.1 Proponents of 
scientific racism held black people to be closer than white people to nonhu-
man primates in the Linnaean “Great Chain of Being,” closely intertwining 
hierarchies of race and species.2 Countering the “animalization” of enslaved 
black people, abolitionist arguments frequently insisted on the humanity of 
the enslaved, often by likening them to free white people and answering the 
rhetorical question “Am I Not a Man and a Brother?” with an emphatic “Yes.” 
Asserting the similarity of enslaved black people to free white people thus be-
came a prominent tactic of abolitionist literature, which used this stipulated 
sameness as an assertion of interracial national kinship and an imperative for 
feeling across racial lines. 
However, even as nineteenth-century discussions emphasizing the humanity 
of black people served as arguments against their enslavement, other abolitionist 
arguments employed animals as points of familiar reference, in cross-species 
comparisons that were also meant to garner interracial sympathy.3 Some aboli-
tionist children’s literature, especially, deployed this strategy, using domesticated 
animals to mediate their readers’ sympathy for enslaved people. This model 
of sympathy, which is not dependent on articulations of sameness, is a more 
progressive model for affective sympathy and kinship because (unlike the other 
prominent models of abolitionist sympathy) it has the potential for promot-
ing such affective relationships across acknowledged positions of difference. 
Kelly Oliver has recently noted that stranded “Katrina dogs” received 
more sympathetic attention in US media coverage of Hurricane Katrina than 
African Americans similarly stranded in New Orleans, “seemingly because 
many white Americans can feel more sympathetically toward dogs than they 
can toward African Americans.”4 The problem Oliver and others have noted 
in this apparently misplaced sympathy lies in the question of whether this 
affective prioritization amounted to a valuation of dogs over black people. I 
contend that the problem is more complex than this explanation allows. The 
question of valuation, though legitimate, works against the abolitionist model 
of humanistic sympathy-through-sameness described above. Sympathy for 
nonhuman animals (particularly for nonprimates) is not dependent on same-
ness alone. Rather, I argue that this sympathy has more to do with notions of 
proximity or familiarity. If some white people felt more keenly for the dogs 
than they did for the African American people who were displaced by Katrina, 
this was not necessarily because they believed the dogs to be more similar to 
themselves than to black people. The problem is not that some white people 
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cared about Katrina dogs. It is that they did not also care about poor, African 
American people. To be clear, the prioritization of Katrina dogs over the hu-
man residents of New Orleans is a problem inflected by racism and classism. 
However, the widespread popular sympathy for Katrina dogs indicates that 
perceived similarity is not a prerequisite for sympathy, as many popular aboli-
tionist texts assumed. For this reason, sympathy that can be transferred across 
species difference also has the potential to be transferred across racial difference, 
even though it was not in the case Oliver discusses.
In the antebellum United States, the apparent similarity of enslaved black 
people to free white people was most prominently emphasized through depic-
tions of mixed-race heroes and heroines. Believing that their audience would 
find such characters inherently more sympathetic to their white (predominantly 
Northern) readers by virtue of their resemblance to them, popular abolitionist 
writers such as Lydia Maria Child, Harriet Beecher Stowe, and William Wells 
Brown employed mixed-race characters to garner white sympathy. The par-
ticular horror of “white slavery” in the enslavement of people who resembled 
white ideals of physical appearance, speech, and Christian education illustrated 
the potential danger of enslavement for people who believed themselves to be 
beyond the dangers of that race-based system.  
While the enslavement of mixed-race (and especially visually “white”-look-
ing) people was a reality of the “peculiar” institution, this tactic has been long 
critiqued for its model of how sympathy is conveyed. This strategy assumed 
that characters who more closely resembled white people in these ways were 
more likely to elicit sympathy from white readers than black characters who 
did not. Literary critics have rightly acknowledged the problem with a model 
of sympathy that made readers’ recognition of similarity or sameness a prereq-
uisite for sympathetic affect.5 A more progressive model of sympathy would 
not depend on similarities but allow for sympathy’s transfer across positions 
of clear difference. This essay examines antebellum abolitionist literatures in 
which this more progressive model of sympathy—one that moves across ac-
knowledged positions of difference—becomes possible. Emphasizing enslaved 
people’s humanity and their distinction from nonhuman animals was not 
abolitionism’s only way of referring to animals, and not all abolitionist argu-
ments depended on a model of sympathy that necessitated the sympathizer’s 
similarity to the enslaved. Abolitionist children’s literature published between 
the 1830s and the 1860s, for example, often employed animals in comparison 
with—rather than in distinction from—enslaved black people, with an effect 
distinctly different from the comparisons of scientific racism.6 Although this 
strategy is also present in abolitionist literature for adults, in the abolitionist 
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children’s literature discussed here, the affective rhetoric is prominent and 
clear, remaining in the foreground rather than existing as an accompaniment 
to other arguments against enslavement. I read abolitionist children’s literature 
in which affective relationships are possible despite differences in race and spe-
cies in order to show how this difference-based model of abolitionist sympathy 
worked against the more prominent sameness-based model.7 
Unlike the prioritization of sympathy for mixed-race people, the model of 
sympathy present in these animal-focused abolitionist stories and poems for 
children is more in line with progressive notions of antiracism that appreci-
ate difference, rather than call for its erasure. The fact that sympathy might 
sometimes be more easily felt across positions of difference than similarity (as 
in the case of the Katrina dogs) discounts what some abolitionist writers as-
sumed about their white audiences. By examining this model of sympathy, we 
might be able to understand why many white Americans had more sympathy 
for dogs than for African American people affected by Katrina, while rejecting 
the racist notion that dogs were necessarily better able to elicit white sympathy. 
Additionally, understanding how sympathy may be conveyed across positions 
of difference opens up possibilities for both antiracist discourse and human–
animal studies. When we ask for whom one can have sympathy, we must look 
beyond comparisons between beings, and the hierarchies that accompany 
them. I present abolitionism as one version of humanism, in its dependence 
on the category of the human for an ethics of interracial relations, arguing that 
comparisons of humans and other animals—primarily pets—have the potential 
for a more productive discussion of sympathy.8 Despite their failings, the texts 
I discuss present a model of sympathy that, by refusing to view difference as 
foil to sympathy, has the potential to resist hierarchies of race and species. 
Abolitionists and Animals
Theories of scientific racism provide one prominent racialized use of animals, 
embedded in derogatory comparisons of nonwhite people with nonhuman 
primates, especially. Neel Ahuja laments what he has deemed “the conflation 
of race and species” in animal studies, which he claims “often assimilates 
racial discourse into species discourse, flattening out historical contexts that 
determine the differential use of animal (and other) figures in the process of 
racialization.”9 For nineteenth-century American readers, however, popular 
understandings of race were informed by theories of scientific racism, which 
rendered race and species never fully extricable from each other. The evocation 
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of species in racialized discourse does not simply “assimilate race critique into 
species critique, taking animalization as the generic basis of racism,” then, but 
is evidence of an overlapping discourse of difference, which simultaneously 
hierarchizes both race and species in a single “Great Chain.”10 
The illustration comparing classical “Greek,” “Negro,” and “ape” profiles, 
from Josiah Nott and George Gliddon’s 1854 Types of Mankind, demonstrates 
the combined hierarchization of race and species in nineteenth-century tax-
onomies (see fig. 2).
Figure 2.
Josiah Nott and George Gliddon, Types of Mankind (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippencott, 1854). Courtesy of 
the American Antiquarian Society.
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In this brand of scientific race theory, made popular in the United States by 
writers such as Nott, Gliddon, Samuel Morton, and Louis Agassiz, references 
to animals in racialized discourse were not mere metaphor. Rather, this “ani-
malization” of racial others speaks to the very construction of race as a concept, 
that is, as a mode of difference akin to differences in species. As this illustration 
suggests, nineteenth-century scientists entertained questions of whether racial 
differences constituted species differences. The ideology of chattel slavery, 
therefore, depended on a theorization of racial difference akin to speciesism, 
marking nonwhite people as evolutionarily different from white people.11
The rhetoric of scientific racism shows us why conventional humanist argu-
ments were necessary to reframe ideologies of racial difference. By comparing 
the racial other to the animal other, human rights could be more easily denied 
within Enlightenment scientific and philosophical hierarchies that prioritized 
the category of the human. Abolitionist texts responded to the racialized 
animalizations of scientific racism, invoking animals instead to articulate 
humanist arguments about race and emphasizing the categorical difference 
between slaves and animals. 
Abolitionist arguments about enslaved people’s humanity had two main 
parts. The first was a simple articulation of humanity: slaves are not animals, 
but people. This point registers most iconically in the Josiah Wedgewood 
antislavery medallion, but was also present in abolitionist children’s literature 
of the antebellum period. A conversation from The Young Abolitionists; or Con-
versations on Slavery (1848) illustrates this point with a child who asks, “The 
slaves are people, mother, are they not?,” and a mother who replies, “Yes, they 
are men and women.”12 The mother’s expansion on this yes genders enslaved 
people as “men and women.” By adding gendered specificity to the categories 
slaves and people, she hints at the fact that enslaved people are not a homoge-
neous group. This gendering therefore signifies individualization. While the 
categories men and women might create a problematic binary, the extent to 
which enslaved black people were denied claims to any positive associations 
of masculinity and femininity indicates how recognizing enslaved people as 
“men and women” was a significant, humanizing gesture.
The second humanist abolitionist argument indicated animalization as a 
particular mistake of enslavement: the American system of chattel slavery, by 
definition, treated people as though they were animals, and this was one of its 
many moral problems. Scenes in which the conditions of enslaved people are 
compared with those of livestock abound in abolitionist literature, with the 
implication that humans ought not to live under the same conditions as ani-
mals and ought not to be similarly commodified. In one popularly circulated 
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example, Sojourner Truth recounts that she and other enslaved people were 
relegated to “sleeping on those damp boards, like the horse, with a little straw 
and a blanket” and that later, when sold at auction for the sum of one hundred 
dollars, that “she [had] an impression that in this sale she was connected with 
a lot of sheep.”13 Children’s abolitionist literature made similar comparisons, 
as can be seen in an analogy from Ann Preston’s antislavery collection, Cousin 
Ann’s Stories for Children (1849). “Tom and Lucy: A Tale for Little Lizzie” 
narrates the sale of a black, enslaved girl: 
Her master took the trader’s gold;—
Such wicked things they do;
Just like a calf was Lucy sold,
Though she was good as you.14
The poem seeks to break down racial hierarchies in comparisons that would 
treat a black child “like a calf ” (i.e., saleable), instead comparing enslaved 
black children to free white children. “Tom and Lucy” makes this comparison 
a matter of valuation, telling its readers that Lucy “was [as] good as you” and 
implicitly indicating the problem of her sale by assuming that its readers would 
recognize the immorality of selling white children like themselves. 
To counteract the prominence of racist comparisons between animals and 
nonwhite people, abolitionist literature was fairly saturated with examples like 
these. It therefore seems that comparisons of enslaved people with animals 
might counteract the abolitionist project of humanizing the enslaved. Common 
household pets, however, offered a point of recognition for Northern, white, 
child readers, most of whom were likely to have had little or no interaction 
with either enslaved or free black people. Because pets had become common by 
the nineteenth century, certain kinds of domesticated animals—most notably 
cats, dogs, and birds—were familiar to many middle-class white children.15 
I turn next to the rhetorical moments in which abolitionist texts emphasize 
similarities between animals and the enslaved, a genre in which animals and 
enslaved people appear interchangeable. I am concerned with how compari-
sons of animals and enslaved people can mediate across, not simply substitute 
for, lines of race and species. But first we must examine the possibilities and 
limits of substitution.
A commonly held belief that still persists about animal cruelty is that it 
might easily slip into violence toward humans. In the antebellum period, this 
belief resulted in similar—sometimes simultaneous—instruction of children 
in kindness toward animals and people.16
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Children’s literature against animal cruelty and children’s abolitionist litera-
ture are related both historically, through the overlapping social movements for 
abolitionism and animal welfare in the United States and England, and generi-
cally, in their shared sentimental approaches to evoking readerly sympathy.17 
Before the animal welfare movement reached full speed in the late nineteenth 
century, the similarities of abolitionist and animal welfare rhetorics were vis-
ible in antebellum texts that emphasized the relation between how people treat 
animals and how they might treat other people. 
An episode in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s 1852 novel Uncle Tom’s Cabin il-
lustrates popular beliefs about the connections between cruelty—and sympa-
thy—toward animals and the enslaved.18 We observe this in Stowe’s model of 
white, Northern, middle-class womanhood, Mrs. Bird. While Mrs. Bird was 
“generally the most indulgent and easy to be entreated of all mothers,” we 
read that “still her boys had a very reverent remembrance of a most vehement 
chastisement she once bestowed on them, because she found them leagued with 
several graceless boys of the neighborhood, stoning a defenceless [sic] kitten.”19 
Stowe does not recount this episode to explicitly promote animal welfare but 
rather to illustrate Mrs. Bird’s capacity for interracial sympathy. Her sympathy 
for the kitten provides a partial explanation for her sympathy for Eliza Harris, 
an enslaved woman who has emancipated herself and her son, Harry, whom 
Mrs. Bird harbors in defiance of her legal obligation (by virtue of the Fugitive 
Slave Act) to assist in their reenslavement. 
Mrs. Bird’s protection of the kitten and of Eliza and her son are rendered 
comparable by the juxtaposition of these similar reactions to “anything in the 
shape of cruelty.”20 While pairing Mrs. Bird’s sympathy for the kitten and for 
the enslaved indicates both her similarly directed humanity and the shared 
histories of the antislavery and animal welfare movements, it also serves as an 
example of abolitionist comparisons of enslaved people and animals. Although 
elsewhere Stowe’s text prioritizes mixed-race characters such as Eliza and Harry 
as particularly able to garner white sympathy by virtue of their resemblance 
to white people, the episode of Mrs. Bird and the kitten does not suggest that 
her sympathy for the animal is dependent on this kind of likeness to herself. 
Stowe’s juxtaposition of Mrs. Bird’s interspecies and interracial sympathy 
was not unique in the nineteenth century. The logic of this kind of literature, 
as Colleen Boggs explains, allows “animals [to] mediate liberal subjectivity” 
through a “didactic ontology” invested in “the practice of teaching children 
how to be human by teaching them to be humane.”21 A similar example of 
this ontology in abolitionist children’s literature is Mary Martha Sherwood’s 
1831 The babes in the wood of the New World, which depicts a child’s similar 
| 495Race, Species, and Affective Kinship in Nineteenth-Century Abolitionism
instruction in kindness toward dogs and slaves. The child narrates an adult’s 
preparation for seeing enslaved people for the first time: “Then they told me 
that I should see some people behaving very cruelly to them [slaves], but that 
they hoped I would try to shew [sic] them every kindness in my power; and 
my aunt Lucy reminded me of the blow which she had once given me because 
I had hurt a poor dog.”22 Here previous instruction against hurting a dog is 
meant to show that unkindness to slaves is similarly immoral (and, perhaps, 
that it would be similarly punished).
This story, like Stowe’s episode, indicates that both animals and enslaved 
people might be read as objects of readerly sympathy and that both inspired 
similar action. In this respect, the rhetorics of abolitionism that promote the 
freedom of certain kinds of animals and those promoting the freedom of en-
slaved people look remarkably similar. In effect, enslaved people and captive 
animals become interchangeable in certain stories. To illustrate the extent of this 
interchangeability, it is worth noting that, while some abolitionist stories (like 
Stowe’s and Sherwood’s, above) present instruction in how one ought to treat 
animals as a model for learning to treat the enslaved, others used abolitionist 
rhetoric to indicate how one ought to treat certain animals. 
With the historical connections between abolitionism and animal welfare in 
mind, it is easy to understand how the cause against animal cruelty appropri-
ated the genres and rhetorical structures of abolitionism. However, explicitly 
abolitionist literature for children already contained the roots of animal welfare 
literature in its common slippages between enslaved people and captive animals. 
This slippage is apparent in another poem from Preston’s Cousin Ann’s Stories 
for Children, about a young boy keeping a squirrel as a pet. “Howard and 
His Squirrel” reads as an anti–animal captivity story framed by the explicitly 
abolitionist language of slavery and freedom:  
But Howard thought he should not like
 A little slave to be;
And God had made the nimble squirrel,
 To run, and climb the tree.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
A bird or squirrel in a cage
 It makes me sad to see;
It seems so cruel to confine
 The creatures made so free.23  
In Eliza Cabot Follen’s Hymns, Songs and Fables, for Children (1831), more 
explicitly abolitionist texts such as “Remember the Slave” and “The Little 
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Slave’s Wish” are accompanied by the “Soliloquy of Ellen’s Squirrel, on Receiv-
ing his Liberty;—Overheard by a Lover of Nature and a Friend of Ellen.” The 
squirrel tells Ellen that 
The thought that you have set me free,
 That I can skip, and dance like you,
To your kind, tender heart, shall be
 As pure a joy as e’er you knew.24 
The idea that certain kinds of animals ought not to be kept captive abounds 
in Northern antebellum children’s literature, and the similarities between 
abolitionist and anti–animal captivity stories make texts like this one and Fol-
len’s “Billy Rabbit to Mary,” also included in this volume, look very much like 
other abolitionist writing. Presented as a letter written by a self-emancipated 
rabbit to the child who had tried to domesticate him, Billy Rabbit muses on 
his joyful freedom: 
To him, who a hole, or a palace inhabits,
 To all sorts of beings, to men, and to Rabbits,
 Ah, dear to us all, is sweet Liberty,
 Especially, Mary, to you and to me.25
While these poems might very well be read as animal welfare literature, 
they have been commonly regarded as abolitionist texts.26 The animals in 
these poems stand in for, or appear interchangeable with, enslaved people: 
their condition of captivity alludes to the similar condition of enslaved African 
Americans in the 1830s and 1840s, although they contain no direct reference 
to or representation of enslaved people. “Howard and His Squirrel” appeared 
in the same collection alongside “Tom and Lucy,” implying that, while some 
animals might be sold “like a calf,” others are wrongly held captive. Follen’s 
“Soliloquy of Ellen’s Squirrel” and “Billy Rabbit to Mary” were accompanied 
by “The Little Slave’s Wish,” in which an enslaved boy compares his condi-
tion with that of animals who are free, wishing he was a bird, a butterfly, 
or a deer, rather than an enslaved person.27 These poems’ publication in an 
abolitionist collection and their clearly abolitionist rhetorics indicate not only 
the relatedness of the animal welfare and abolitionist movements and their 
respective bodies of literature but also constitutes a slippage between the two. 
Put simply: these poems read like other abolitionist texts, but slaves have been 
replaced with animals.
Moreover, similarities between how animals and enslaved people appear in 
these texts rendered stories about kindness to animals and kindness to enslaved 
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people uncomfortably similar.28 As Leslie Ginsberg acknowledges, children’s 
stories about the emancipation of animals also countered proslavery arguments 
that sentimentalized relations between slaveholders and enslaved people figured 
as beloved pets.29 Still, comparisons of people and pets also risked reinscribing 
racist arguments about enslaved people’s dependence on white benevolence 
and the necessity of interracial stewardship. 
A story by Louisa May Alcott in the juvenile periodical Our Young Folks 
illustrates these problems. In “Nelly’s Hospital” (1865), a young girl endeavors 
to nurse sick or injured animals. The story is reminiscent of Alcott’s Hospital 
Sketches or the well-known “My Contraband / The Brothers” (1863), as Nelly 
frees a black fly from a spider’s web: 
Nelly had heard much about contrabands, knew who they were, and was very much inter-
ested in them; so when she freed the poor black fly, she played he was her contraband, and 
felt glad that her first patient was one that needed help so much. Carefully brushing away 
as much of the web as she could, she left small Pompey, as she named him, to free his own 
legs, lest her clumsy fingers should hurt him; then she laid him in one of the soft beds with 
a grain or two of sugar if he needed refreshment, and bade him rest and recover from his 
fright, remembering that he was at liberty to fly away whenever he liked, because she had 
no wish to make a slave of him.30  
Later we learn that “the winged contraband had taken Nelly at her word, and 
flown away on the journey home.”31 While young Nelly’s play seems innocent 
enough, there remains something unsettling about the comparison of a black 
fly—an animal generally considered a pest—and a black “contraband” soldier. 
Still, the comparison inserts into this story an antislavery sentiment that seems 
extraneous to the text, but on which Nelly’s treatment of the fly is predicated. 
“Nelly’s Hospital” displays an attitude toward creatures found in the wild 
similar to the stories of Preston’s and Follet’s freed squirrels and rabbits: the 
belief that animals, like people, ought not to be held in captivity against their 
will. At face value, these comparisons do not evoke the necessarily derogatory 
associations that scientific theories of racism create through their hierarchical 
taxonomies of humans and animals—or, at least, they do not seem deroga-
tory to the same extent. In these stories, neither animals nor nonwhite people 
are portrayed negatively, exactly, though both serve as vehicles to instruct 
the assumedly white, middle-class children who read these depictions. Such 
animal–human comparisons function within the space between abolitionism’s 
tendency to insist on the necessity of white benevolence for emancipation and, 
as “Nelly’s Hospital” suggests, the project of positioning animal welfare as the 
next frontier of white, middle-class social justice movements. 
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Animal–Human Mediation
These uncanny resemblances between stories about animals and abolition-
ism were not lost on nineteenth-century readers. On the contrary, some 
abolitionist texts depended on these resemblances to make comparisons very 
different from those of scientific racism. Rather than reduce nonwhite people 
to the lower status of animals, they used the particular status of beloved ani-
mals—family pets—to compensate for what they viewed as a potential failing 
of white, Northern sympathy: the inability to feel across racial lines. While 
some of the most popular antebellum abolitionist writers have been criticized 
for their use of mixed-race characters to garner sympathy from white readers 
who may or may not have been incapable of sympathizing with dark-skinned 
African American characters, some abolitionist writers did not rely on enslaved 
characters’ resemblance to white readers for sympathy. Not simply displac-
ing figures of enslaved people and replacing them with anthropomorphized 
animals (as Ellen’s Squirrel and Billy Rabbit do), the stories discussed below 
used the familiarity of family pets to mediate readers’ sympathy across lines 
of both race and species. 
The Lamplighter Picture Book is an 1855 revision of Maria Susanna Cum-
mins’s 1854 sentimental novel The Lamplighter. The Lamplighter Picture Book 
reframed Cummins’s novel (which is not generally viewed as an abolitionist 
text) for a younger audience and reoriented it toward an abolitionist cause. 
Composed of selections from Cummins’s original text interspersed with an-
tislavery poetry, the picture book centers on the story of young Gerty, who 
is orphaned, unloved, and abused by her guardian until a kindly, Christian 
lamplighter rescues her.32 The book’s introductory stanzas first present the 
overarching abolitionist ambition of the text: “Not alone by little Gerty / Is 
the telltale muse inspired.”33 The story of Gerty’s suffering is framed in parallel 
to the suffering of enslaved people, as an early poem asks that 
Ye who sigh as from these pages
 Gerty’s sorrows you may learn,
Ne’er forget the bondman’s sadness,
 Never from his pleadings turn.34  
Throughout the book, one reads about and sympathizes with Gerty, and in 
the accompanying poetry is invited to compare her position as an abused 
child with that of enslaved and self-emancipated people. Gerty falls just short 
of making this comparison, herself, in another poem, “Gerty in the Wood 
Yard,” where we read,
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At times a snow-white sail she spied,
 Far out upon the sea,
And queried if a soul on board
 Was sorrowful as she;
She knew not that there might be slaves,
For freedom sighing or their graves.35 
Although Gerty does not know that the ships she sees may be carrying hu-
man cargo, the comparison between herself and these unknown passengers is 
implied, as the reader might surmise that the enslaved were, indeed, “sorrowful 
as she.” One might expect that the text’s initial comparison of the orphaned 
child to the enslaved person would continue, explicitly associating Gerty with 
enslaved black people. But no enslaved characters venture closer to Gerty than 
when she spies the “snow-white sail . . . far out upon the sea.” 
Moreover, this cross-racial comparison is complicated by another—cross-
species—comparison in the text. Also in the wood yard, Gerty first encounters 
the stray cats with whom she sympathizes and with whom the narrative also 
identifies her. The cats are described as “frightened looking creatures, who, like 
Gerty herself, crept or scampered about, and often hid themselves among the 
wood and coal, seeming to feel, as she did, great doubts about their having a 
right to be anywhere.”36 Gerty’s position in relation to the cats—and the slaves, 
I will show—changes, when the kindly lamplighter, Uncle True, gives Gerty the 
present of a kitten. We read of her taking the kitten home, sheltering him, and 
sharing her food with him despite the danger in which this puts Gerty vis-à-vis 
her guardian. Gerty comes to cherish her pet, but he is soon killed when her 
guardian flings the kitten into a pot of boiling water. Glenn Hendler’s analysis 
of this scene in Cummins’s original novel is indebted to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
discussion of mediated sympathy. Hendler explains that, while “Cummins 
may have been asking the reader to pity the cat—briefly,” the animal merely 
mediates the sympathy meant for Gerty herself.37 In the abolitionist version 
of Gerty’s story, though, the figure of the slave further complicates how that 
sympathy is mediated in the text.
The Lamplighter Picture Book presents interracial sympathy mediated 
through an animal as the story of Gerty’s kitten is reframed in abolitionist 
rhetoric. As in the novel, Gerty decides to keep the kitten, even though she 
knows she will have to struggle to feed him and hide him from her guardian. 
But the picture book transforms this act into an explicit reference to the 1850 
Fugitive Slave Act, as the poem “Gerty’s Little Kitten,” explains that 
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Thus kind are some good persons, oft,
 When slaves for aid are asking;
Right deeds, they know, whate’er the law,
 Will make God’s favor lasting.
And thus good people often give
 The fugitive a lodging,
Ne’er fearing those, intent on gain,
 About his pathway dodging.38  
Unlike Ellen’s and Howard’s squirrels, and Billy Rabbit, this cat never actually 
stands in for an enslaved person, but exists as the victimized animal in an anal-
ogy that explains relations of sympathy. Gerty’s identification with the cat—
who is then identified with the fugitive slave—mediates white sympathy for 
black people through a supposedly more familiar sympathy with domesticated 
animals. Put another way, cross-racial sympathy, here manifesting in the desire 
to harbor the fugitive, is compared to a more familiar act of sympathy—the 
desire to care for a stray kitten. 
Framed as an analogy, Gerty has sympathy for the kitten just as the abolition-
ist has sympathy for the enslaved. The logic of the abolitionist text demands 
that the reader take up this model: “and thus, good people often give / The 
fugitive a lodging.” The instructive nature of this poem is clear: young readers 
are meant to read the story of Gerty and her kitten, and transfer the sympathy 
that they share with her through the animal, to the racial other—an other 
whom the text simultaneously distances from its assumedly white readers, even 
as it mediates interracial sympathy. Regarding Gerty as a model for abolitionist 
sympathy, the reader is meant to identify with her in the text—though never 
with the cats or with enslaved people. Although Gerty is initially positioned 
as somehow “like” her fellow-sufferers, the cats in the wood yard and the sor-
rowful slaves on the faraway ship, she is soon transformed from the object of 
sympathy to its subject, repositioned as the giver rather than the elicitor of 
sympathy. Her sympathy is not dependent on this likeness in the text or the 
supposed likeness of the assumed readers to cats, slaves, or orphaned children, 
but is mediated through these various positions of difference. Through her 
relation to the kitten, Gerty becomes a model for readerly sympathy, aligned 
not with the enslaved but with the abolitionist. 
The identification of the potentially abolitionist reader with Gerty works 
only as a parallel, analogous model though, rather than a literal one. Gerty 
does not show us how to be an abolitionist. Her sympathy remains one step 
away from sympathy for fugitive slaves, who appear in abstracted form in the 
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picture book’s poetry but never enter into Gerty’s narrative. The story compels 
the reader to take the abolitionist’s position, which it presents in parallel to 
Gerty’s position. Thereby, it presents slaves and kittens as similarly parallel. 
The kitten and the slave are not, however, interchangeable in this structure. 
The Lamplighter Picture Book does not quite go so far as to argue that slaves 
are like cats, but it does offer a model of sympathy that allows Gerty’s story to 
function as a model for abolitionism. To understand this structure of sympathy, 
we must look to the story’s assumptions about cross-racial and cross-species 
sympathy, and about how and to whom that sympathy might be transferred.
Domestic Proximity and Animal Kinship
Why do we need the story of Gerty and her kitten to convey abolitionist 
sympathy for the enslaved? The answer lies in the text’s assumptions about 
its potentially abolitionist, assumedly white readers. Cummins’s picture book 
shows that comparing the relative sympathy white people might have for ani-
mals and for African American people is not a new phenomenon. This model 
of sympathy is ruled by a similar logic to that which regarded the mixed-race 
characters of abolitionist literature as particularly able to garner white sympathy 
because of their supposed similarity to white people. However, in these com-
parisons between cats, enslaved people, and Gerty, we see objects of sympathy 
who are not dependent on the reader’s supposed similarity to or identification 
with them. On the contrary, the reader is meant to feel for each of these figures 
despite his or her position of difference from them. 
The presence of animals in this text helps us understand how this model of 
sympathy does not depend on sameness but works, rather, despite difference. 
Boggs notes the “double sense of identification and disidentification” with 
animals in literary narratives, writing that “because the animal is like them 
[people], they are asked to extend kindness, but the kindness they extend makes 
them human steward of the animal and marks their separation from it.”39 This 
is a more complex structure than stewardship, however. When animals are 
depicted as proximate to humans, familiar to them, or when their position as 
objects of sympathy is relied on to mediate sympathy between humans, that 
sympathy is figured across notions of difference, as both animal and human 
others are positioned as somehow proximate to, but not necessarily like, the 
sympathizer. What I call animal–humanist sympathy is dependent on this 
understanding of proximity, rather than distinction. A notion of domestic 
proximity may produce what Oliver calls “an ethics of relationality,” allowing 
sympathy to be transferred across positions of “difference or alterity,” rather 
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than necessitating “sameness” for ethical behavior.40 We might understand 
certain animals as proximate to humans (though not necessarily “like” them) 
by virtue of their presence in domestic spaces. Relations between people and 
other animals can therefore be understood, in part, as constructed through 
their domestic proximity to one another, rendering them more likely objects 
of sympathy by virtue of their familiarity.
Since, as Amy Kaplan has shown, domestic spaces have national implications 
in the nineteenth century, proximity works on multiple geographic scales in 
these stories.41 The characterization of domesticated animals as familiar, here, 
might also be understood as familial—that is, as figured in affective kinship rela-
tions or through larger notions of national kinship and belonging—by virtue 
of their proximity to humans in domestic spaces. In the dual understanding 
of the word domestic, which renders the home a microcosm for the nation, 
we see how certain kinds of animals figure as members of a (white) American 
national family. The iconic presence of cats and dogs in nineteenth-century 
depictions of white, middle-class domesticity illustrates this point.42
If we put aside notions of sameness and difference in The Lamplighter Pic-
ture Book in favor of notions of domestic proximity, we see that domesticated 
cats appear here closer to Gerty than enslaved people do. Rather than assume 
that sympathy must be conveyed across notions of perceived sameness (as 
abolitionism’s “whitewashed” mixed-race literary figures are often employed), 
this text assumes that sympathy is more easily conveyed across positions of 
domestic proximity that render cats familiar to Gerty and, presumably, to the 
(white, Northern) readers of the picture book. Gerty and the kitten are not 
simply “like” one another in the text, but they share domestic spaces. This is 
true in the literal sense of Gerty’s respective physical proximity to the cats in 
the wood yard and the slaves “far out upon the sea.” Further, Gerty’s and the 
cats’ physical proximity to one another and their similarly precarious positions 
of “seeming to feel . . . great doubts about their having a right to be anywhere” 
locate both the child and the cats on the margins of this domestic space, but 
still within a frame that might be recognizable to the reader.43 
As The Lamplighter Picture Book blurs differences between interspecies and 
interracial relationships, it suggests that the proximity of potentially abolition-
ist white readers to familiar, domesticated animals—like cats—is closer than 
their proximity to enslaved people. The analogy “Gerty is to the kitten as the 
abolitionist reader is to the fugitive slave” works because of the assumed famil-
iarity of this first pairing. Put another way, the act of caring for a pet kitten is 
assumed to be familiar to the book’s readers, and therefore it serves as a suitable, 
recognizable model for how white people ought to act toward enslaved or self-
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emancipated people, who may be less familiar. If, as The Lamplighter Picture 
Book and the case of the Katrina dogs assume, white sympathy is mediated 
more easily across species than race, it seems that this sympathy is necessar-
ily limited. Mediating cross-racial sympathy through familiar domesticated 
animals figures racial others and animals in parallel relations to white people, 
rendering enslaved black people sympathetic to white people—rather ironi-
cally—only in the historical familiarity of their subordinated domestication. 
In one sense, the often paternalistic rhetoric of abolitionism retains hierarchies 
of both race and species in the subordination of both animals and enslaved, 
black people to white people. 
However, when we more closely examine the model of sympathy provided 
by Gerty and her kitten, we find a relation not simply dependent on either 
likeness or subordination but forged out of proximity and familiarity, open-
ing up a more progressive model for ethical behavior. When we take into 
account nineteenth-century theorizations of race and difference as (literal 
or metaphorized) differences in species, we cannot pose animal difference as 
necessarily outside “the possibility of ethical relations.”44 The blurring of lines 
between animals and humans in nineteenth-century texts calls into question 
the differentiation itself. As arguments for racial hierarchy are also dependent 
on the hierarchization of humans over other animals, when we call into ques-
tion the nature of animal–human difference, the comparison of animals and 
nonwhite people is reframed.  
The animal-mediated interracial sympathy of The Lamplighter Picture Book 
models a form of humanism that is dependent on the nonhuman as referent. 
The animal referent in this model of animal-mediated interracial sympathy 
(i.e., the cats in this text) is not simply posed in opposition to humans but 
figures in proximity to both the white human sympathetic subject and to the 
nonwhite human objects of sympathy (i.e., slaves). The shared sense of their 
mutual marginalization facilitates Gerty’s association with her pet kitten, for
The child loved “Kitty” all the more
 Because she was in danger,
And braved Nan’s wrath some milk to gain
 To feed the little stranger.45
Gerty’s own othering sets her apart from the text’s other white characters. In 
fact, Gerty is compared only to the cats and to enslaved black people in the 
picture book. Her marginalized position makes the transfer of sympathy across 
positions of difference a necessity, as Gerty is not “like” any other human char-
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acters. While animal-mediated sympathy may indicate a limited sympathy in 
the sense that the animal is positioned as somehow necessary for facilitating 
interracial sympathy, this model of sympathy is also not dependent on notions 
of sameness for ethical behavior, but allows sympathy to be transferred across 
acknowledged positions of difference—that is, even to a “stranger.” 
Gerty’s ability to sympathize across difference therefore offers a more progres-
sive model for interracial and interspecies relationships. Insofar as they evoke 
sympathy across acknowledged positions of difference, I argue, domesticated 
animals are familiar, rather than similar here. They also figure as potentially 
familial in their relations of care and belonging in shared domestic spaces. 
Proximity seems to be one marker of relationality, in which sympathy—and 
possibly feelings of kinship and belonging—might be mediated across differ-
ence. The case of Gerty and her kitten is one example of such relationality 
to animals. The relation of Gerty to the kitten is not simply one of speciesist 
domestic subordination but, in her similar state of subordination, one that 
more closely resembles ties of affective kinship. We might view the kitten Gerty 
cares for as her sole kinship relation at this point in the text. The kitten is a 
fellow-creature whom she welcomes into her domestic world with the hope for 
love and companionship—importantly, in the absence of any such sentiment 
from her human guardians. In this, the familiar and the familial are blurred 
within the shared domestic space that Gerty and the kitten both inhabit. 
Understandings of familial belonging are doubly relevant here because they 
also reflect on nineteenth-century discourses of race and slavery. In John Neal’s 
short story “The Instincts of Childhood” (1842), we read an animal–slave com-
parison that is essential to the story’s abolitionist argument and that hinges on 
parallel models of family. Closely resembling the narratives of “wild” animals 
such as squirrels and rabbits kept as pets and then given their liberty, stories 
about children who decide to free birds from cages also abound in nineteenth-
century children’s literature. In Neal’s story, young Margaret keeps a family 
of birds in cages, where she believes they have everything they could need or 
want. However, because she has placed the father bird in a cage separate from 
the mother and babies, the birds are upset, though she fails to recognize why. 
Her father asks how she would feel were he separated from their family, and 
she understands the connection. She wonders, though, who would take care 
of the birds if she did not. Her father explains that the birds can care for them-
selves, or else God will provide for them. Margaret ultimately frees the birds. 
Later, Margaret’s parents are complaining about an enslaved woman who is 
distraught because her husband has been sold away. Margaret makes an easy 
connection to the earlier conversation about the birds and points to the cage. 
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Her father then makes a paternalistic argument in support of slavery: black 
people are better off enslaved than having to take care of themselves. Finally, 
Margaret asks, “Who feeds the young ravens, father? Who takes care of all the 
white mothers, and all the white babies we see?” to which he replies, “I know 
what you are thinking of, but then—there’s a mighty difference, let me tell 
you, between a slave mother and a white mother—between a slave child and a 
white child!”46 Although Margaret is persistent, her father remains unconvinced 
at the end of the story. 
What Margaret learned about the birds has unintentionally taught her 
something about enslaved people. Although her father is unwilling to make 
the connection between caged birds and enslaved people, the daughter uses 
this connection, hinging on the father’s initial comparison of the birds to their 
own white family. What the daughter realizes, with her true child-abolitionist 
instincts, is not simply that slaves are like birds but that, when it comes to ques-
tions of freedom and captivity, both birds and slaves are like white people, and 
that the model of family with which she is familiar might be applied to both. 
The abolitionist political cartoon “Pointing a Moral” (fig. 3) provides a 
similar comparison of families, further evidencing the limitations of animal–
human comparisons for abolitionist logic while also using the rhetoric of 
family for its ultimate humanist argument. The conversation accompanying 
the illustration reads as follows:
Little Sis—“Oh, par, look how miserable poor Pussy is since you sent all her kittens away!”
Par (who is an ardent Abolitionist)—“Yes, my darling! Now you can form some idea of what 
the poor black slave’s mother suffers when her little ones are taken from her.”
Little Sis (eagerly)—“Does black peoples have all their little kittens taken away from them?” 
In short, the “moral lesson” exposes the fundamental problem of the equa-
tion “kittens are like slaves” by showing that slaves do not have “all their little 
kittens” but their human children “taken away from them.” If we are to take 
selling enslaved children as worse than dispensing with a cat’s kittens (which 
this humanist argument assumes is the case for its potential readers), the ex-
ample that this father gives his child is logically insufficient, in a way that the 
proto-abolitionist child recognizes. The lesson here is that enslaved people 
are less appropriately compared to cats than to white people. This text also 
outlines the difference between human and animal families: cats are to kittens 
as human mothers are to human children. 
What the child’s articulation of this difference explains, and what the 
mother in the background of the image also suggests, is that slave families 
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are not, in fact, just like cat families but like 
white human ones. The cartoon assumes the 
similarity of human families to one another 
across racial lines, which can, perhaps ironi-
cally, be shown by comparison with animal 
families. If we are to grasp the moral, which demands that we think of cats and 
enslaved people differently, we must also assume some degree of homogeniza-
tion among human families. The mother in the background reminds us of the 
more appropriate equation: the relation of enslaved, black mothers and their 
children is equal to that between free, white mothers and their children. This 
equation requires a more radical realization than the first, and this realization 
is the subtext of the lesson. The fundamental assumption here, of course, is 
that we ought to prioritize human children over kittens, and the resounding 
reason for this prioritization has to do with perceptions of kinship, that is, 
who counts as family.
Figure 3.
“Pointing a Moral,” Frank Leslie’s 
Budget of Fun, No. 62, May 1863. 
Courtesy of the American Antiquar-
ian Society.
| 507Race, Species, and Affective Kinship in Nineteenth-Century Abolitionism
Abolitionist articulations of humanity were sometimes paired with more 
specific definitions of who counts as family, as abolitionists extended argu-
ments about enslaved people’s humanity to imply notions of Christianized 
or national kinship with free, white people. The question “Am I Not a Man 
and a Brother?” is a rhetorical one. By answering yes, we also must take into 
account its conjunction of humanity with kinship—the phrase a “man AND 
a brother” suggests not only recognition of humanity but membership in some 
form of universally construed national or human family. As Follen has it in 
an 1846 poem from The Liberty Cap, this condition of belonging in kinship 
is sufficient for inclusion in the category of humanity: 
He asks, Am not I man?
 He pleads, Am not I a brother?
Then dare not, and hope not you can
 The cry of humanity smother.47
Similarly, the idea of Christian kinship shared across racial lines is assumed 
by most abolitionist rhetoric. As The Slave’s Friend (1838) asks and answers, 
“What! is the slave a brother or sister to those who hold them in bondage? 
Yes. All men are the children of God.”48 This argument about brotherhood 
or sisterhood is as much an articulation of religiously or nationally construed 
familial obligation as it is a response to pseudoscientific theories that pose racial 
differences as differences of species. 
After Charles Darwin’s publication of On the Origin of Species in 1859, 
the British anatomists Richard Owen and Thomas Henry Huxley deliberated 
about evolutionary relatedness. Their main debate during the early 1860s 
concerned the comparative brain structures of humans and apes, and the ques-
tion of what differentiated humans from other primates.49 The poem “The 
Gorilla’s Dilemma” from Punch (1862) takes up arguments about humanity 
and brotherhood, in a demand to assess evolutionary relatedness in terms of 
kinship relations:  
Say am I a man and a brother,
 Or only an anthropoid ape?
Your judgment, be’t one way or ‘tother,
 Do put into positive shape.
Must I humbly take rank as quadruman
 As OWEN maintains that I ought?
Or rise into brotherhood human,
 As HUXLEY has flatt’ringly taught?
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For though you may deem a Gorilla
 Don’t think much of his rank in creation,
If of feeling one have a scintilla,
 It glows to know “who’s one’s relation”—
Apes and monkeys (now crowding by dozens
 Their kinship with us to have proved),
Or an OWEN and HUXLEY for cousins,
 Though, it may be, a little removed.50
In short, Huxley supported Darwin’s theory of common descent and the trans-
mutation of species on the basis of similarities in brain structures among pri-
mates, while Owen argued for the separateness and uniqueness of humankind. 
“The Gorilla’s Dilemma” conflates notions of evolutionary proximity and 
kinship, falsely positing that brotherhood necessarily follows from humanity. 
Scientific race theory is embedded in the evolutionary debate, as the question of 
one’s “rank in creation” applied to the scientific taxonomies of writers like Nott, 
Gliddon, and Thomas Henry Huxley, whose theory of evolution also included 
nine classifications of race and the belief that “Negroes” were evolutionarily 
located somewhere between apes and European people.51 In the context of 
evolutionary science, the question of “who’s one’s relation” is present not in 
spite of but because of an allusion to racial difference as also evolutionary. The 
poem later confirms this by asking “What are ‘Cures,’ Nigger-dances and jibes 
/ To the black spider-monkey’s contortions?” in a move that reminds us of other 
contemporaneous—and derogatory—comparisons of humans and animals.52
This juxtaposition of race and species is rendered even more apparent by 
the appearance of “The Gorilla’s Dilemma” on the same page of Punch as a 
short poem titled “Black Ingratitude.” The latter is a commentary on aboli-
tion and racism, and ends with the line “Our black friend’s much more Free 
than Welcome.”53 Despite “Liberty’s benignant spell,” abolition fails to fully 
include black people in white structures of national and familial belonging.54 
While “The Gorilla’s Dilemma” juxtaposes differences of race and species, its 
ultimate inconclusiveness (“Had I better be monkey or man, / By enlightened 
self-interest’s suggestion? / Say you-for hang me, if I can”) leaves the question 
of animal–human kinship unanswered, and unsurprisingly so, given similarly 
inconclusive discourses on race, humanity, and kinship.55
The overlapping discourses of nineteenth-century scientific and social justice 
debates on race and species and the shared, fuzzy spaces within which differ-
ences in each were defined do not necessarily indicate that these differences 
are of the same kind or degree. However, the shared rhetorics of similarity and 
social obligation in race and species discourse show how these categories were 
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similarly conceived in nineteenth-century literary and scientific conversation. 
Another poem from Punch inspired by scientific evolutionary theory, “Mon-
keyana” (1861), also alludes to the iconic abolitionist question “Am I Not a 
Man and a Brother?” and is as inconclusive as “The Gorilla’s Dilemma” in its 
answer.56 More emphatic than the details of the scientific debate this poem 
outlines is the accompanying image that brings abolitionist rhetoric to bear 
on evolutionary science.57
Taken apart from the poem, this image might be read as racist commentary 
just as easily as evolutionary commentary about species difference.
Figure 4.
“Monkeyana,” Punch, No. 40, May 18, 1861. Courtesy of the Division of Rare 
and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library.
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The visual and associative anthropomorphism of the illustration is accom-
panied by a reference to humanity and kinship, as the gorilla’s sign poses a 
similarly rhetorical question to that of the antislavery medallion, with a slight 
syntactical difference (“Am I” rather than “Am I Not”). This rhetorical differ-
ence suggests that a negative answer might follow more easily here than from 
the abolitionist image, hinting—in contrast to the coupling of humanity and 
kinship in “The Gorilla’s Dilemma”—that the inclusion of nonhuman primates 
in evolutionary proximity to humans does not, in fact, necessitate their inclu-
sion in notions of human kinship. This proximity—unlike that of Gerty and 
her kitten—may not be sufficient for humanist notions of kinship. If this is 
its evolutionist assumption, one wonders what the image suggests about race.
These forceful examples of intertwined discourses of race, species, and kin-
ship demand not only that we acknowledge their shared historical discourse 
but that we rethink the function of difference defined by this discourse. The 
abolitionist texts discussed above illustrate the limitations of humanist rheto-
rics that depend on familiar animals to evoke cross-racial sympathy. But they 
also allow us to reevaluate the role of similarity and difference for producing 
sympathy—and even feelings of kinship and belonging. This reevaluation 
demands an alternative model of sympathy that deprioritizes notions of 
sameness, acknowledging that even humanist sympathy can function across 
relations of alterity.
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